The paper takes a relatively novel approach to analysing the link between economic fundamentals and exchange rates by investigating the importance of realtime data of news about fundamentals. It is argued that this approach captures more accurately the true information available to market participants when making their daily investment decisions. We find that such economic news in the United States, Germany and the euro area have indeed been a driving force behind daily US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate developments in the period 1993-2003. The larger importance of US macroeconomic news for the exchange rate are found to be at least in part explained by their earlier release time compared to corresponding German and euro area news. Exchange rates are also shown to respond more strongly to news in periods of large market uncertainty and when negative or large shocks occur. Overall, the model based on real-time data is capable of explaining about 75% of the monthly directional changes of the US dollar-euro exchange rate, although it does not explain well the magnitude of the exchange rate changes.
Introduction
20 years after the influential paper by Meese and Rogoff (1983) , only modest progress has been made in explaining and predicting exchange rate movements with macroeconomic fundamentals. While fundamentals-based models have been developed over the years that perform reasonably well in explaining exchange rate developments in the long-run, econometric attempts to explain short-and medium-term movements in exchange rates have had limited success so far.
1 There is a broad consensus that some of the reasons for the poor performance of empirical models to account for exchange rate developments on a short-and medium-term horizon have not only to do with econometric problems, such as small sample biases, but also with irrationality of market participants, bubbles, herd behaviour etc., i.e. factors which cannot be captured sufficiently well as to be included in econometric models.
This paper takes a different and relatively novel approach to analysing the link between fundamentals and exchange rate movements in the short-term. We argue that a potentially important shortcoming of standard, fundamentals-based models of the exchange rate is that they use measures of fundamentals that do not accurately reflect the true information market participants have when making trading decisions. In this paper, we instead use real-time data, i.e. daily market announcements of important macroeconomic variables as well as announcements of monetary policy decisions, as measures of fundamentals. More precisely, exploiting survey data on market participants' expectations of such announcements, we are able to extract the surprise or "news" component of each variable.
We then test whether these market news about fundamentals are capable of explaining the behaviour of daily exchange rate movements. This methodology has the key advantage of allowing us to test much more directly whether fundamentals -as they become available to market participants -are capable of accounting for the price discovery process in foreign exchange markets. For the empirical implementation of the methodology, we focus on the most important macroeconomic and monetary policy news in the United States and the euro area/Germany for the period 1993-2003 and test for their importance in explaining the exchange rate movements of the US dollar vis-à-vis the euro and German mark.
While most work on the effect of real-time data on foreign exchange markets has focused on explaining changes in the conditional variances (e.g. Bollerslev 1998, Ederington and Lee 1993) , only relatively few studies have so far attempted to test for the effect of macroeconomic news on the conditional mean process of foreign exchange markets. Most of the previous work using real-time data focuses on intra-day data, usually 5-minute intervals, for analysing the effect of macroeconomic news on exchange rate levels. Almeida, Goodhart and Payne (1998) look at the DM exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar and find significant intra-day effects of macroeconomic announcements. This is in line with some of those authors' earlier work (Goodhart, Hall, Henry, and Pesaran 1993) , who find US as well as UK macroeconomic news change the British pound-US dollar exchange rate.
The most recent study in this spirit is Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) , who look at five currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar for the period January 1992 till December 1998. Using five-minute market intervals, they find that various US news about macroeconomic variables significantly affect exchange rates. An interesting result of the work by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) is that they find some indication for the presence of asymmetries in exchange rate responses to fundamentals, in that exchange rates tend to react more strongly to large news surprises and to negative news.
This paper here attempts to make a contribution to this literature in two central regards. First, the paper focuses on the presence of asymmetries in the reaction of exchange rates, and in particular on the question whether existing market conditions are an important determinant for explaining why the conditional means of exchange rates react differently to macroeconomics news over time. This is an important issue as the theoretical work on herd behaviour and information cascades (e.g. Banerjee 1992, Bikchandani, Hirschleifer and 1992) stresses that markets may incorporate information in a highly asymmetric fashion. The paper shows evidence for the presence of such asymmetries, and that the differences in effects are frequently quite large.
Second, the paper provides an evaluation of the overall importance of macro news on exchange rates. For this purpose, the paper is different from the literature in that it analyses exchange rate responses at a daily frequency. The main motivation for using daily rather than intra-daily frequency is that work with intra-daily data has shown a mostly very shortlived effect of news on exchange rate levels, with the effects often disappearing within minutes (e.g. Dominguez 1999, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 2003) . From a broader perspective, news about macroeconomic fundamentals are important for overall exchange rate movements only if these effects are sufficiently long-lived in that they drive exchange rate developments on a daily or monthly frequency.
We find three key results. First, we show that news about fundamentals can explain relatively well the direction in recent years, but only to a much smaller extent the magnitude of monthly exchange rate developments. The model with real-time data correctly explains the direction of the US dollar-euro exchange rate in 3 out of 4 months, or about 75% of the cases. We show that the exchange rate model using real-time data outperforms strongly the same exchange rate model using vintage data. The model using real-time correctly explains 73% of the directional changes of the exchange rate, whereas the model using vintage data only correctly accounts for 60% of the directional changes.
This suggests that by focusing on real-time data, we can improve our understanding of movements in exchange rates at the short-to medium-term horizon.
Second, we find that news about the US economy have a larger impact on exchange rate movements than daily news emanating from the euro area. We show that this may reflect not only the relatively greater importance of the US economy, but that it at last in part is explained by the fact that US announcements are usually released earlier than comparable euro area or German announcements. The implication is that US announcements have a relatively higher news content than comparable euro area announcements.
A third important finding is that the effects of news on exchange rates are asymmetric in that they crucially depends on market conditions. More precisely, news releases have a particularly large effect on exchange rates in times when there is a high degree of market uncertainty, in the sense that previous news did not provide a clear and unanimous signal to market participants about the direction of the economy. In addition, exchange rates tend to react more strongly to news in periods when previous exchange rate volatility has been high.
The paper is structured in the following way. We proceed in section 2 by outlining the rationale for using real-time data and by explaining why such an approach may be more promising in establishing a link between exchange rates and fundamentals. Section 2 also discusses the construction of our data set, in particular how we extract market "news" about economic fundamentals. Section 3 then briefly outlines our econometric approach, which is based on an iterative weighted least square estimation procedure. The empirical 5 results are presented in sections 4 and 5. Section 4 provides the results for the linear models, whereas Section 5 tests for the presence of asymmetries in news effects on exchange rates. An overall evaluation of the performance and goodness-of-fit of our realtime model on a short-and medium-term horizon follows in section 6. Section 7 concludes with a short discussion of the findings and their implications.
Exchange rates, fundamentals and news: the data

Fundamentals and news: the case for using real-time data
The question of how to accurately measure economic fundamentals is a difficult one. Most empirical work, not only on the determination of exchange rates but more generally of most asset prices, employs the most recent vintage data, i.e. the final, revised measures of economic variables that are generally released several months or quarters later. There are a number of problems with such a use of the data. In particular, economic variables are mostly released only with a considerable time lag. Moreover, the first release of data on fundamentals is mostly revised at least once and in some cases several times. It often takes several quarters for the final data of an economic variable to be released. What therefore econometric work does that employs such final, revised data is essentially trying to explain changes in asset prices with explanatory variables that are mostly not known to market participants until several months later. Given the often abrupt changes in asset prices and their high degree of volatility in the short-to medium-term, it may therefore not be surprising that the performance of models using such lagged data is limited.
The use of real-time data instead, i.e. data that is actually available to economic agents at any one point in time, can fundamentally alter the results and interpretations of economic models. Orphanides (2001) , for instance, finds that interpretations of monetary policy in the United States change fundamentally when using real-time data instead of vintage data as is common when estimating Taylor rules. Koenig et al. (2000) show that the forecasts performance for US GDP changes substantially when using real-time data.
To illustrate the bias that may arise from the use of vintage data, However, it should be emphasised that an announcement is of relevance for markets only to the extent to which it has not been anticipated. This is not to say that the announcement itself has no relevance for the markets, but it implies that what we can measure is only the response of markets to the unexpected component, or "news" or "surprise", of an announcement. The remaining component of the announcement has been incorporated into the market previously, but since we cannot determine the exact timing of when this occurred, we cannot measure its impact on the markets to the same degree of accuracy.
Our measure of news is therefore the surprise component (S k,t ) of the announcement k, which is defined as the difference between the actual announcement (A k,t ) and the market's prior expectation (E k,t ), normalised by dividing by the sample standard deviation Ω k of each announcement in order to allow a comparison of the relative size of the coefficients in the econometric model:
The data source for the macroeconomic variables is MMS International. This data is based on a survey of around 40 market participants on the Friday prior to each announcement.
Our data set includes about 120 news for each variable, given the time period 1 January 1993 -14 February 2003 and the fact that announcements for most variables occur on a monthly frequency. Tables 2 and 3 show some summary and descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic variables for the United States, Germany and the euro area included in the model. Previous work using MMS expectations data shows that statistical tests confirm unbiasedness and efficiency of the survey data (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2002) . Finally, Figure 2 shows the figures for the non-standardised surprises for all the macroeconomic and monetary policy variables.
We also look at news about monetary policy decisions as a potential factor driving movements in the US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate. Similar to the approach for the macroeconomic variables, we extract the market surprise about monetary policy decisions using survey data from Reuters. We define the monetary policy surprise as the difference between the actual announcement by the Fed, ECB or Bundesbank and the mean of the expectations of the around 25-30 market participants in the Reuters survey. As shown in out previous work on money markets (Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2002) , this measure of monetary policy surprises proves not only unbiased and efficient statistically but performs relatively well empirically compared to other measures of such surprises. Table 4 presents some summary statistics for the monetary policy announcements and surprises for the three central banks and confirms that market participants were mostly able to anticipate monetary policy decisions well. Our results also confirm previous work that underlined that market participants were able to anticipate decision by the ECB relatively well (e.g. Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2002, Perez-Quiros and Sicilia 2002) .
Exchange rates and frequency issues
A key issue is the frequency of the econometric analysis. A number of previous studies using real-time data (Almeida et al. 1998 , Andersen et al. 2003 have employed highfrequency data based on 5-minute trading intervals. There are two key reasons why we chose not to follow this approach. First, although MMS International lists the official release time of each announcement, it is widely acknowledged that such release times tend to be inaccurate for German data releases as some of the releases are "leaked" to the markets minutes or even hours prior to their official release time (Andersen et al. 2003) . It may therefore not be surprising that studies using such high-frequency data do not find much econometric evidence for an effect of German news on exchange rates. A second reason is that asset prices may initially "overshoot" in their reaction to news. This may imply that the true permanent effect of news on exchange rates may be smaller than the initial, immediate reaction.
By contrast, the main drawback of choosing a daily frequency is that a large number of news, far larger than could possibly be measured and observed, "hits" the markets throughout a typical trading day. Hence our estimate of the news effect of any given macroeconomic variable includes a lot of noise from other news during the day. However, the important point to emphasise is that this does not lead to a bias in the estimates of news effects as long as the other news during the days of a particular announcement are not systematic or reflect other recurring news. It only means that the point estimates are not efficient, resulting in larger standard errors of the coefficients of the news effects.
As we are particularly interested in comparing the importance of US news with the role of euro area and German news, we chose a daily frequency for our empirical analysis.
For the choice of the exchange rate, we use the US dollar -euro/DEM rate at 18.00
Eastern Standard Time (EST). This ensures that both European and US news of the same day are reflected in this exchange rate. Nevertheless, European news are mostly announced before US news on any given day, given the time difference of mostly 6 hours between continental Europe and the East coast of the United States.
Exchange rate responses to news: the econometric model
We choose an iterative, weighted least squares (WLS) procedure, adopting a similar approach to Andersen et al. (2003) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) , in order to test for the news effects of daily announcement surprises and in order to account for the data characteristics described in the previous section. The benchmark model we estimate is
where e t is the daily, nominal US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate, 3 s t are the news surprises in each market, and MON and FRI are included to account for potential day-ofthe-week effects. Lags of the exchange rate change are also included to correct for possible autocorrelation, although in most cases a single lag was sufficient, which moreover was not always significant in the estimation.
Since the error term ε t is non-normal and heteroskedastic, we correct for this by using an iterative WLS approach. The first step implies estimating equation (1) via OLS. The second step then estimates the time-varying ε t in the following way:
with η t defined as the absolute values of the surprises s t . In the third step, the estimated
2 -is then employed as instrument in the WLS estimation of equation (1). These three steps are iterated till convergence is achieved. 4 Finally, we conducted different tests to control for possible multicollinearity problems resulting from the fact that some of the announcements occur on the same day.
One way of doing this is to exclude from the model some of the news that frequently occur on the same day. However, the results did not change in any significant way. We therefore opted to keep all 25 monetary policy and macroeconomic news variables in the model. Table 5 presents the news effects on the US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate for 12 US macroeconomic news, 11 German/euro area news, and the two monetary policy surprises in both areas for the full sample period of 1 January 1993 -14 February 2003.
How important are fundamentals? Empirical results for linear models
Exchange rate responses to news reflecting the real economy
Most of the variables have the correct sign in that an improvement in real economic conditions in the United States leads to an appreciation of the US dollar (i.e. a lower US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate) whereas good news in the euro area/Germany induce a appreciation of the euro/DEM vis-à-vis the US dollar, and analogously for negative news in the two areas. Overall, however, US news prove to be more important in driving exchange rate developments than euro area/German news.
Most of the variables for the real economy of the United States have indeed a statistically significant news effect on the exchange rate: an improvement in NAPM, a rise in non-farm payroll employment, faster GDP growth, higher consumer confidence, lower unemployment and a longer workweek all lead to an appreciation of the US dollar. An improvement in the trade balance, faster growth in industrial production and larger retail sales also tend to appreciate the US dollar, though these variables are not statistically significant over the whole 1993-2003 sample period (see Table 5 ). To provide an order of magnitude of the news effects of fundamentals, for instance a surprise of one standard deviation in the advance US GDP measure leads, on average, to a 0.62% appreciation of the US dollar.
Most euro area/German economic fundamentals also have the correct sign in that an improvement in real conditions in the euro area/Germany lead to an appreciation of the euro/DEM. However, the IFO business confidence indicator is the only real economic variable of the euro area/Germany that is statistically significant over the full sample period. Nevertheless, the news impact of the IFO indicator is relatively large: an improvement in the IFO index by one standard deviation causes a 0.85% appreciation of the euro/DEM vis-à-vis the US dollar. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the importance of this variable may partly compensate for the lack of significance of other euro area news variables. In a market environment with a large number of news releasesas is the case in the euro area where most countries provide additional data announcements for their own country -market participants may choose to turn to fewer indicators about the state of the real economy. It seems that the IFO index is such a benchmark indicator for the euro area. Moreover, it should be noted that the IFO index is one of the earliest data releases for Germany and the euro area, and thereby may also function as an indicator for market participants about what to expect about later data releases (see Figure 1 ).
In short, the results suggest that fundamentals about the real economy have a significant effect on the US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate.
Exchange rate responses to monetary policy shocks
In contrast to the real side of the economy, our theoretical prior for the effect of monetary policy news on exchange rates is ambiguous. Based on interest rate parity and arbitrage conditions, an unanticipated monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve should induce an appreciation of the US dollar, while an unexpected tightening by the ECB/Bundesbank should lead to an appreciation of the euro/DEM after the news release of such a decision.
5
However, the reaction of exchange rates to monetary policy decisions also depends on the market's interpretation of the underlying reasons for the decisions and the expected effect on the economy. For instance, an unexpected easing of monetary policy may signal to market participants that the real economy and other asset prices, such as equities, will receive a significant boost. Hence the easing of monetary policy in such a case may not lead to a depreciation but even to an appreciation of the exchange rate. Table 5 shows that a shock to US monetary policy has a significant and large effect on the US dollar. The point estimate implies that an unexpected tightening of the federal funds target rate by 50 basis points causes a 0.8% appreciation of the US dollar against the euro. By contrast, unexpected monetary policy news by the Bundesbank and the ECB did not have a significant effect on the DEM and euro exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar.
Exchange rate responses to news about price developments
Concerning news in price developments, there is also no clear-cut theoretical prior to how the exchange rate should react. On the one hand, higher than expected inflation may raise expectations of monetary policy tightening, entailing an immediate appreciation of the home currency. On the other hand, higher inflation implies, ceteris paribus, an appreciation of the real exchange rate. For purchasing power parity to hold, a rise in inflation requires a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
In essence, the likely effect of price developments on the exchange rate crucially depends on the markets' beliefs about the central bank's monetary policy reaction function.
If a central bank is perceived to give great importance to price stability, then an unexpected rise in inflation is likely to lead to an appreciation of the exchange rate. By contrast, if a central bank is believed to give less prominence to price developments or is believed not to react to a particular news about prices, then the second argument above may prevail and the exchange rate depreciates. Table 5 reveals that the US CPI news are borderline significant at the 90% level with a positive sign. This implies that a rise in US inflation tends to lead, on average, to a depreciation of the US dollar. This is consistent with the second explanation given above.
How important is the announcement timing?
Besides the economic content of an announcement, it is likely that its effect on exchange rates depends on the lag between the announcement and the underlying economic fundamental. In other words, exchange rates are likely to react more strongly to the release of a leading indicator than to the release of the final revision of GDP, which refers to economic activity several months ago. Andersen et al. (2003) provide some suggestive evidence in this direction, without conducting statistical tests. As can be seen in figure 1 , the announcement timing varies strongly for the different variables. Some announcements (e.g. for US consumer confidence) are made towards the end of the month for the same month, or quickly afterwards (like the US NAPM indicator). Others are made more than two months later.
We test the hypothesis that announcement timing matters for the effect on exchange rates in two ways. First, we analyse whether the size of the estimated response is related to the announcement timing; and second, we test whether the significance of the estimated response differs according to the announcement lag. Hence, we regress the absolute values of the coefficients and t-statistics obtained in table 5 on the maximum announcement delay, which we measure by the maximum number of days that pass from the end of the month to which the announcement refers until its release. 6 Table 6 reports the results.
Whereas the magnitude of a coefficient is only weakly related to its announcement timing, its significance is so very strongly. Despite having only 23 observations, the effect of timing is estimated very precisely with a t-statistic of 1.98. Each day of announcement delay makes the t-statistics in table 5 drop by 0.2. This finding implies that economic content seems to govern the magnitude of responses, whereas announcement timing strongly determines the significance of the exchange rate response.
Exchange rate responses to composite indicators of macroeconomic news
The lack of significant news effects emanating from German and euro area announcements need not imply that the exchange rate does indeed not react in a systematic fashion. It could similarly be that even a sample size spanning 10 years is not sufficient to capture the systematic effects of each individual announcement, especially if the exchange rate response depends on factors like the market conditions, or other special circumstances surrounding each announcement, like e.g. their size or sign. In order to increase the number of observations available for analysis in the remainder of this paper, we create two composite indicators capturing all macroeconomic variables in the US and all those in the euro area and perform further testing using this aggregated series.
For this purpose, we generate two indicator functions, one each for the United States 
We estimate equation (3) using the WLS methodology described in section 3, with results for German and US news reported in the first rows of tables 7 and 8, respectively.
Due to the pooling of all domestic macroeconomic variables into a single measure, the estimates of the size of the exchange rate response become statistically significant, with each parameter showing the expected sign.
The drawback of this approach of course is that the coefficients can be interpreted only as average measures of the news effects of a country's fundamentals and hide the heterogeneity of the importance of individual variables, as outlined in sections 4.1-4.3.
However, the key point we want to make with this analysis is that also euro area news about fundamentals have an important and significant effect on the exchange rate, even if this effect is somewhat smaller than that of US fundamentals.
Asymmetries in exchange rate responses to news of fundamentals
Since the linear benchmark model of section 4 can only reveal average, systematic reactions of the exchange rate, it is necessary to analyse whether the reaction is indeed time invariant, or whether news effects of fundamentals depend on factors like the existing market conditions. Work on herd behaviour (Banerjee 1992 ) and informational cascades (Bikchandani et al. 1992) , for instance, show that economic agents may interpret, process and react to information in very different ways depending on the conditions and the environment in which they operate. In particular, the news content of any given news may be larger if there is a high degree of uncertainty in the markets and market participants search for guidance about the future course of the economy.
The aim of this section is to analyse whether such asymmetries are present in foreign exchange markets. While there has been some work on this issue for bond markets (Fleming and Remolona 1997) , such analysis is quite novel for foreign exchange markets. 8 We analyse the role of different measures of market uncertainty, looking at the size and sign effects of news (section 5.1), and at exchange rate volatility and uncertainty about the future direction of the economy (section 5.2).
differences in the econometric results. Also note that monetary policy shocks are not included in this indicator functions. 8 Galati and Ho (2001) conduct some asymmetry tests for exchange rates and find mixed evidence for the short period of 1999-2000. Andersen et al. (2003) find responses to vary depending on the sign of the news and the uncertainty of the forecast.
Size effects and sign effects of news
There is a broad literature for equity markets showing that stock prices react more strongly to negative news than to positive ones. The underlying reason for this asymmetry lies in the interaction of what is commonly known as leverage effects and volatility feedback effects. 9 The argument is that a shock affects the level of asset prices not only directly by changing the state of the world -altering the leverage of firms -but also by changing the volatility of asset prices. A positive shock raises the stock price of a firm by improving its leverage, but at the same time the increased volatility lowers the stock's value because risk-averse investors require higher returns for bearing the additional risk. In case of a positive shock, leverage effects and volatility feedback effects have the opposite effect on the asset price while the two effects are mutually reinforcing in case of negative shocks.
Thus, negative shocks tend to have a larger effect on the level of equity prices.
We test for the presence of such sign effects for foreign exchange markets by using the same indicator function of section 4.5, distinguishing between "good" news, "bad" news and no news in the foreign exchange market. To check for the difference between the effects of such positive news and negative news, we estimate the model 
with D P,t =1 if the news is positive (I t =1) and D N,t =1 if the news is negative (I t = -1), both dummies being zero otherwise. The estimation therefore enables us to compare the coefficient for the effect of good news (β P ) with the one for negative news (β N ), and for both the United States and the euro area.
The second row in Table 7 shows that only negative news in Germany/ the euro area have a statistically significant effect on the exchange rate. However, there is no such evidence for the United States, where the point estimate is similar for both types of news, and both are estimated to be statistically significant.
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A question related to the one on sign effects is whether large shocks have a bigger impact than smaller ones. The rationale for such size effects, again widely confirmed for the analysis of other asset prices, is that larger shocks may contain a proportionally larger news content, thus causing a larger adjustment of the exchange rate. We define the model for testing this hypothesis in a similar way to equation (4), only now that D P,t =1 if the news is in the highest or the lowest quartile of the distribution and D N,t =1 if the news is in the middle two quartiles of the distribution. The third row in table 7 shows evidence for such size effects for Germany/the euro area: it is the large surprises that exert a statistically significant impact on exchange rates, whereas small surprises are insignificant.
Overall, the findings provide support for the hypothesis that the reaction of exchange rate to macroeconomic news depends both on the sign as well as the size of the news that reaches the financial markets.
The importance of uncertainty
Theoretical and empirical models of news and uncertainty have argued that market participants may react more strongly to news in periods when they are uncertain about the state and direction of the economy (e.g. Veronesi 1999 ). To investigate this link in our context, we test whether the exchange rate reacts more strongly to news when uncertainty among market participants is high. We explore different proxies for uncertainty.
First, we ask whether news have a larger effect if previous exchange rate volatility has been high. We therefore define high market uncertainty as the situation when exchange rate volatility was above its sample mean during the previous one week, one month, two months etc. till one year. Which of these time horizons is most sensible essentially depends on the memory and previous experience of market participants. It seems that market participants may give greater weight to the immediate past and we therefore prefer the volatility measures with shorter horizons, but nevertheless test also for longer horizons.
Our econometric model is similar to the one of equation (4), only that now DP,t=1 if the exchange rate volatility over the previous 1 week or 1 month etc. was above its sample mean, and DN,t=1 if the volatility was below its mean. Row 4 in tables 7 and 8 reveal that the news effects of fundamentals are particularly significant if exchange rate volatility was high during the previous week, for both the United States and the euro area. Using longer time horizons for measuring exchange rate volatility does not change this finding.Second, we test whether news have larger effects on exchange rates during periods when markets were surprised by previous news systematically in the same fashion, e.g. if there has been a 10 Unfortunately, statistical tests on differences between the coefficients in the right and left panels of tables 7 series of positive surprises or an accumulation of negative surprises over the last period.
The hypothesis in the vein of the influential work by Veronesi (1999) is therefore that markets react less to news when previous news have been pointing in the same direction, i.e. if they have been persistently more positive or persistently more negative than expected, and more if previous news were contradictory to one another.
As before, such a measure can be calculated over different time horizons. Choosing a three-month horizon, we define the history of surprises to be of different signs if the cumulated surprises of I t over the past one month were in the middle two quartiles of its distribution. Accordingly, the history of surprises is defined to be of the same sign if these cumulated surprises are either very positive -i.e. in the top quartile -or very negative -in the bottom quartile of the distribution. Our econometric model is again similar to the one of equation (4) Formally, a period of "high domestic uncertainty", as in row 7 of Tables 7 and 8, is defined when there have been more large than small surprises over the past one month, three months, etc. In this context, we define a surprise to be large if it is above its average value.
Row 7 shows the results when accounting only for domestic news, while row 8
shows results taking into account news in the United States and the euro area. The findings are convincing as they show that both the US and the euro area markets react significantly to news only in periods of high domestic uncertainty. For German announcements, this conclusion also holds when defining uncertainty to include the surprises emanating from and 8 do generally not show any significant difference.
the United States (row 8 of Table 7 ). Overall, the findings provide support to the hypothesis that markets react more to news in an environment of uncertainty.
Evaluating the real-time model of fundamentals and exchange rates
We have so far shown that fundamentals have indeed a significant and time-varying effect on exchange rates on a daily basis. What we have not answered so far is how well fundamentals can explain overall changes in exchange rates, i.e. to evaluate the goodnessof-fit of our real-time model. This is an important question because the statistical significance of parameter estimates for daily fundamentals by itself does not necessarily imply that fundamentals explain well the magnitude or even the direction of exchange rate movements in the short-to medium-term.
For this purpose, we take the coefficients obtained from estimating equation (1) Nevertheless, the real-time model based on surprises correctly indicates the general trend of the exchange rate over time: that is, an expected appreciation of the US dollar between 1993 and late 1999, and a recovery of the euro thereafter. What this implies is that during the period 1993-1999, economic agents were, on average, relatively more positively surprised by economic news in the United States than in Europe. This is intuitively 11 The reasons for moving from daily frequency to monthly frequency are that many days in our model do not have any announcements, and also the fact that actual and predicted exchange rate developments become more easily comparable graphically when using a lower frequency than daily data.
convincing as the United States moved from a recession in the early 1990s to a tremendous economic boom in the late 1990s, during which the economic performance of the US economy outpaced that of the euro area and Germany. After 2000, the US economy slowed down much more significantly, albeit from a higher level, than the euro area economy.
This created more negative news about the US economy than for the euro area, and hence our model predicts an appreciation of the euro between late 2000 and 2003. 12 Overall, when looking at the whole sample period 1993-2003, the US dollar -euro/DEM change predicted by the model is almost identical to the overall change in the actual exchange rate.
Given that market participants do not make systematic mistakes in their expectations, one therefore cannot expect the model with news surprises to explain the exchange rate movement in the medium-term. Let us recall that the news s t in our model capture only a small part of the information about fundamentals that are actually incorporated into the markets. Recall that the news surprise s t captures only the unexpected component of an announcement. The expected component has been incorporate previously, but since we do not know when this information has been incorporated we cannot measure its effect on the exchange rate in the econometric model.
As a second step, to capture the effect of the full announcement -i.e. the unexpected component as well as the expected component -we make the assumption that the expected component is incorporated into the exchange rate in the same way the unexpected one is.
We therefore use the coefficients obtained from estimating equation (1) and multiply these with the change in the announcement of each fundamental. We then aggregate the effects of all variables to get the predicted overall effect of fundamentals on the exchange rate. Figure 4 shows the predicted and the actual exchange rates based on this exercise.
The predicted exchange rate now moves much more and tracks significantly better the large swings in the actual US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate. Although the predicted rate does again not explain the large magnitude in the exchange rate swings, it nevertheless does a reasonable good job in tracking the direction of the exchange rate movements. The short-lived appreciation of the US dollar in 1993 is tracked as well as the subsequent appreciation of the DEM till 1995. The model anticipates correctly part of the US dollar appreciation between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, the model tracks reasonably well the overall appreciation of the euro between late 2000 and early 2003. However, the period for 12 Note that these temporary trends in the model with news is not inconsistent with the unbiasedness and efficiency of the expectations of market participants. Of course in the long-run, the predicted exchange rate which the model performs poorly is from mid-1999 to the end of 2000. In this period, the US dollar appreciated by about 20% vis-à-vis the euro whereas our model does not anticipate any change in the exchange rate or even a slight depreciation of the US dollar.
As the third and final step of the goodness-of-fit analysis, we would like to know how the model with real-time data compares to a model using vintage data. Since vintage data becomes available with a delay often of several months, we cannot assign a particular day to when the vintage data is incorporated into prices. We therefore employ the following model that is similar to that of equations (1)- (2), but now uses the change in the announced data (DA t ) rather than the surprise (s t ) component of the announcement and is conducted at monthly rather than daily frequency: 
now with the absolute values of the announcement changes (ïDA t ï). Table 9 compares the absolute changes and the correctly explained directional changes of the model (5)- (6) 1993-2003 and 58% for 1999-2003 . Overall, the ability to account for about 75% of the monthly directional changes in the US dollar-euro exchange rate also compares very favourably to other standard models in the literature using vintage data (see e.g. Cheung,
Chinn and Garcia Pascual 2002).
should not change significantly from its original level in order for the unbiasedness and efficiency of the
Conclusions
The paper presented evidence that monetary policy and macroeconomic fundamentals are indeed an important driving force behind exchange rate movements. The approach the paper took is relatively novel for the analysis of exchange rates in that we look at the role of news about fundamentals. Extracting news from survey data and official announcements, the paper tested to what extent such real-time news in the United States and in the euro area/Germany affected the US dollar -euro/DEM exchange rate during the period 1993-2003.
The empirical findings confirm that news about fundamentals have a significant effect on the exchange rate. Economic developments in the United States prove to play a bigger role in explaining exchange rate movements than economic news in the euro area and in Germany. We show that this finding may not only reflect the relatively greater importance of the US economy, but that it is at least in part due to the fact that US announcements are usually released earlier than euro area or German announcements. The implication is that US announcements have a relatively higher news content than comparable euro area announcements.
A key result of the paper is that the effect of fundamentals on exchange rates depends on market conditions. We find that news about fundamentals have a particularly big impact in an environment of high market uncertainty and large previous exchange rate volatility.
In addition, the results suggest that negative news and large unexpected news have a larger effect on exchange rates than positive and smaller unexpected announcement surprises.
Robustness and goodness-of-fit tests show that our model with real-time data does a good job in explaining the direction though not the magnitude of monthly exchange rate developments. In particular, we find that an exchange rate model with real-time data substantially outperforms the same model using vintage data. Overall, the findings of the paper suggest that looking at real-time data -that is, information that is actually available to market participants when making their trading and investment decisions -may help us better understand and track the importance of fundamentals for exchange rate
developments.
Several open questions arise from the paper. In particular, why does the real-time data model do a good job in explaining the direction but not the magnitude of exchange expectations data to hold.
rate changes? Is this due to the fact that we exclude or cannot measure other relevant news that point in the same direction as the available real-time data? Or is this explained by the overreaction of markets, related to factors such as bubbles or herd behaviour, which goes beyond the information that becomes available to the markets? Future research may further disentangle these issues. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 90%, 95%, 99% levels, respectively. Numbers in brackets are t-statistics. *,**,*** denotes significance at the 90%, 95%, 99% levels, respectively. Numbers in brackets are t-statistics. 
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